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This thesis conducts a comparative analysis of the tilt
rotor aircraft with conventional helicopters using simulator
results from LHX-representative missions. Results regarding
inter-aircraft differences using Ordinary Least Squares
regression analysis are discussed. Also examined are single
versus dual piloted airframe configurations, cockpit designs,
varied background inter-pilot differences, those transitions
from the helicopter to the tilt rotor causing the most
difficulties, those flight missions causing the most operator
overloads, and what automated features best help relieve
these workloads. In addition, pilot opinions from a
questionnaire concerning these subjects are presented.
Results show the tilt rotor superior in hard, maximum effort
turns and in firing at elevated and depressed targets, while
the helicopter has the advantage in lateral movements and
quick hover up/hover down maneuvers. The two-man cockpit
configuration is notably safer with significantly less
operator overloads. Pilot differences between communities
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Army's "Light Helicopter Experimental"
(LHX) program has been at the forefront of concern for Army
aviation officials during the past few years. Its purpose is
to resolve how to best replace the Army's existing and aging
light helicopter fleet. The program, however, has been
plagued and inhibited by tight budgets, indecision over
aircraft requirements, and other areas of concern. Past
studies have helped to resolve some questions that have
arisen, but have really only helped scratch the surface for
the decision makers. The main concern is what type aircraft
should be utilized. The secondary concern is whether it
should be a single or dual piloted aircraft. From there,
many other considerations originate such as cockpit design
and the type of automated features that should be used.
Whether or not the LHX program continues or is ultimately
dropped is still to be determined. Yet, regardless of what
Army officials decide, many useful things have come from the
studies conducted that should prove invaluable in later
analyses and programs. These include: (1) benefits of
helicopter versus tilt rotor, (2) benefits of one versus two-
man airframe design, (3) benefits and workload savings of
particular automated features, (4) what flight missions,
flight maneuvers and mission segments cause operator
overloads, (5) what transitions and/or procedures prove most
difficult for a helicopter pilot when converting to the tilt
rotor, (information that will hopefully be invaluable for the
training command when the tilt rotor becomes operational),
and (6) how to select pilots for further studies based on
their past flying experiences.
This thesis will explore some of the options available to
the U. S. Army, drawing ideas and suggestions from previous
studies, using Operations Analysis procedures to draw new
information from test data bases, analyzing ideas from an
aviator survey and using experience gained from this writer's
aviation past. A major portion of this study will deal with
comparing the tilt rotor aircraft with conventional
helicopters. Opinions and recommendations will be discussed.
II. BACKGROUND1
As previously stated, the immediate and most important
concern for Army officials is the determination of what
aircraft type the LHX should be. In search of answers, the
Army, during the spring of 1987, turned to the RAND
Corporation in Santa Monica, California, to ask for their
help in solving this fast-approaching problem. On 30 June
1987, action began with key personnel from RAND's Army Arroyo
Center visiting NASA Ames and the Army Aerof lightdynamics
Directorate (AFDD) officials at the NASA Ames Research Center
at Moffett Field, California. The means to assess the
capabilities of various aircraft alternatives to perform the
Army's aerial attack and scout missions were available there
including manned helicopter and fixed-wing research
simulators developed by Ames. Other areas of study were
conducted on site at the RAND Corporation and included a
f orce-on-f orce computer simulation (which analyzed unit and
theater-level operational performance), cost and other
pertinent decision factors.
The information in this section was excerpted from a
RAND Corporation report (Veit, 1988, pp. vi-16) and a NASA
Ames Research Center memorandum (Lewis, 1987, pp. 1-7) and
edited by this author.
After extensive research, it was decided that three
designs appeared to best satisfy the Army's tactical light
helicopter aviation requirements. These requirements were
based on current Army doctrine and specified the LHX to be
lightweight, highly survivable, supportable, and affordable,
while featuring state-of-the-art technologies and the ability
to successfully execute all required missions (Hayner, U.S.
Army, 1988). With these considerations in mind, the follow-
ing three aircraft designs became the focus of this study:
(1) a new and advanced conventional helicopter (yet to be
built), (2) an upgraded version of the AH-64 Army Apache
helicopter, and (3) the new tilt rotor aircraft offered by
Bell-Boeing. Many considerations were involved, and included
(1) cost, (2) engineering aspects, (3) maintainability, and
(4) operational performance. One of the Army's restrictions
required a maximum aircraft weight of approximately 10,000
pounds. RAND discovered, though, that a more mission capable
aircraft weighing closer to 12,000 pounds was actually more
cost-effective. They found that a 13% savings in weight
translated into only a 3% savings in total incremental life
cycle costs. Thus, RAND recommended that rather than
focusing on the weight issue, the design should focus on
mission performance, survivability, and cost (force size for
fixed budget). (Veit, 1988, p. vii) As the result of
intense analysis in these areas, the RAND Corporation's
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overall recommendation to the Army in November 1987 was to
choose the advanced conventional helicopter over the other
two alternatives as its LHX choice for the future of light
helicopter operations. (Veit, 1988, p. vi) An additional
reason was that the new airframe would furnish the Army with
an air force capable of enduring well past the year 2000.
Another recommendation, though, was to build and refine a
tilt rotor prototype suitable for their combat needs. During
the analysis, the tilt rotor had proven its advantages in
both range and speed as well as displaying interesting
maneuverability capabilities. Despite its advantages,
however, RAND did not feel that tilt rotor technology was
sufficiently mature enough for a long range Army investment
at this time. They also did not feel that the increased
speed available in the tilt rotor was a significant
operational advantage which, of course, is a subject open to
debate.
Why should the tilt rotor be considered the airframe of
the future, and why was it even considered in the RAND study?
One of the reasons is the inherent limitations of the modern
helicopter. To its credit, a helicopter has large rotary
wings and its control system enables the operator to hover or
fly at low airspeeds while maintaining good aerodynamic
handling qualities, something impossible in a fixed-wing
aircraft. However, its intrinsic design severely limits its
5
attainment of high airspeeds. The limitations as speed
increases are transonic problems due to the occurrence of
shock waves, causing a high-Mach advancing blade while the
retreating blade enters deeper stall conditions. This causes
not only an increased need for required power, but also
creates a loss of lift, induces high aircraft vibration
levels, increases fuel requirements and decreases component
service life due to high stress levels on them (Huber, 1986,
pp. 1-2). Since this severely limits long-range missions,
the helicopter falls short of desired military tactical
requirements and the ideal answer/alternative appears to be
provided by the tilt rotor. It offers the combined
advantages of both the helicopter and the turboprop plane,
capable of hovering and transporting troops into remote areas
while flying at speeds and ranges over twice that of its
rotary-winged counterpart. An in-depth discussion of the
tilt rotor aircraft, including a brief history and future
considerations, can be found in Appendix A.
The RAND objectives in the simulators were to identify
direct discriminators between the two aircraft types when
flown by pilots, determine measures for use in the force-on-
force analysis, and to extend and refine the engineering
analysis of maneuverability. In particular, RAND sought to
answer (at least partially) these two questions:
(1) What are the flight performance differences between
the tilt rotor and the conventional helicopter
configurations, and
(2) What differences do they make in the ability of the
aircraft to engage targets and evade the enemy air defense
threat? (Veit, 1988, p. 1)
Though the tilt rotor actually outperformed (on the
average) the helicopter in a larger number of maneuvers, it
was not so overwhelmingly superior as to tip the scale in its
favor for the final decision. RAND felt it was too risky for
the Army to throw its whole future of rotary wing into an
untried airframe, an opinion which the Army has agreed with
thus far.
Other information, however, can be derived from this
study in addition to that presented to the Army by the RAND
Corporation, such as inter-aircraft differences during
certain maneuvers, inter-pilot differences while considering
past flight history, which maneuvers proved the most
difficult to perform for helicopter pilots when transitioning
to the tilt rotor, and which new technologies introduced in
the tilt rotor caused the most initial difficulties. The
following analysis using econometric procedures attempts to
explore and answer these questions. To begin, a discussion
of the simulator and methods used by the RAND Corporation to
collect their data is presented.
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A. THE SIMULATORS
Simulators were utilized to aid in the operational
effectiveness and flight performance/evaluations of the LHX
project. Utilizing a fixed base, single-piloted, inter-
changeable cab (ICAB) developed at NASA Ames, the two
simulator cockpit mockups modelled the aerodynamics of each
aircraft. The helicopter simulator was designed from a
previously existing model known as ARMCOP. ARMCOP is a
generic, ten degrees-of-f reedom nonlinear mathematical model
which has been expanded to represent some of the aerodynamic
effects of low-speed, low altitude, and steeply descending
flight (Lewis, 1987, p. 2). An advanced model was
constructed for this study to represent the desired LHX
helicopter design. The tilt rotor simulator was designed
from a model developed by Bell Helicopter for the purpose of
tilt rotor research on the XV-15. It is a full nonlinear
mathematical model termed GTRSIM (for Generic Tilt Rotor
Simulator); the version used was originally adapted for use
as a model of the V-22 Osprey, but was configured for this
study to represent an accepted LHX-type tilt rotor design
(Lewis, 1987, p. 2). Thus, the hardware in the simulators
remained nearly the same for each, while differences were
brought about by the software utilized. Visual cues were
identical and performance indicators (i.e., rate of climb,
load-factor limit, side-slip limit, etc.) were similar in
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each model so as to preclude the possibility of immediately
biasing the outcomes.
The cockpits themselves contained all of the essential
displays and controls for flight. In addition, they utilized
a HUD (Heads-Up Display), a convenient means for the pilot to
monitor the flight gauges (i.e., airspeed and altitude
indicators) without having to look inside the cockpit. This
potentially improves flight safety while hopefully decreasing
pilot workload.
Computer generated imagery was utilized and projected
onto the windscreen. The three data bases—HAC, PYLON and
CANYON—each presented pictorially a separate scenario. HAC
was used most frequently and depicted a hilly region with
hilltops from 100 to 1000 feet, and trees from 20 to 60 feet
placed in critical positions according to the mission. PYLON
was a runway scene, while CANYON depicted canyons and
clearings. For a detailed and technical description of the
simulators and their operation, see Lewis (1987, pp. 2-5).
Each pilot was allotted a minimum of two hours in the
simulator to become familiar with the helicopter and tilt
rotor configurations and its computer generated imagery
before any data runs were recorded. In addition, each pilot
flew five to seven trial runs per mission to completely





Target engagements and SAM (surface-to-air missile)
evasion were required maneuvers. The firing logic for both
the tilt rotor and the helicopter were the same to ensure
independent results. For missile launch, a clear line-of-
sight (LOS) was necessary between the aircraft and the
target. When this position was held for three seconds, the
pilot received a tone in his headset indicating that he was
free to launch his missile. Missile fly-out time was set to
a constant thirteen seconds. During this period, the pilot
was required to maintain LOS with the target until missile
impact.
C. SAM FIRING
The sequence for SAM firing was initiated when a LOS
occurred between the SAM site and the aircraft. Launching
sequence was commenced when this LOS existed for twelve
seconds. If this lock-on lasted three seconds longer, the
SAM was launched. Time-of -f
1
ight to target was eleven
seconds, and a successful evasion by the pilot was considered
complete if the aircraft/SAM line-of-sight was interrupted
for two seconds. Both lock-on and missile launching
indicators were available in the aircraft to warn the pilot
of the incoming danger. A hit by the SAM was indicated by a
10
simulated large crack in the center windscreen of the
cockpit.
D. PILOTS
A total of ten helicopter pilots were chosen for the
analysis. Subjects included four Army pilots, four industry
pilots, and two pilots from NASA Ames. All were currently in
flying billets and were familiar with military flying
doctrine and tactics. For individual history of employment
and previous flight times, see Appendix B.
1 • Army
All four Army pilots had experience in scout and/or
attack (SCAT) model helicopters (OH-58 and AH-1, respec-
tively) . None had ever flown a tilt rotor or a tilt rotor
simulator before. Consequently, they were afforded the
opportunity to attend an intense four day course conducted by
Bell Helicopters, receiving seven hours of XV-15 simulator
time and two 1.5 hour flights in the XV-15 itself. Total
helicopter time for the Army pilots ranged from a low of 800
hours to between 3100-5000 hours for the other three. Each
Army pilot flew both the tilt rotor and the helicopter
simulators during the analysis.
2. NASA Ames
These two pilots attended a shortened tilt rotor
course which included one flight in the XV-15. Each had
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already flown 15-20 hours in the XV-15 and had tilt rotor
simulator time (from NASA Ames) prior to this analysis.
Their backgrounds included extensive military flying time
(between 5000 and 5600 hours each) in both rotary-wing and
fixed-wing aircraft. Each of these pilots also flew both the
helicopter and the tilt rotor simulators in the analysis.
3. Industry
The two tilt rotor test pilots from Bell flew only
the tilt rotor simulator, and the helicopter simulator was
flown by two helicopter test pilots, one from Sikorsky
Aircraft and the other from Boeing Vertol. All were also
former military pilots with flight time ranging from 3000-
4300 for the two helicopter test pilots, and from 7000-9500
for the two tilt rotor pilots. The latter two pilots were
the only two with significant tilt rotor experience partici-
pating in this analysis (one had 350 hours, the other 500).
E. MISSIONS
In this analysis, there were a total of seventeen mission
tasks which fell into two categories—maneuvering and
engagement. The ten maneuvering tasks were used to examine
possible differences between the two aircraft in certain
flight regimes, while the seven engagement tasks were
designed to simulate the final stages of typical LHX air-to-
ground missions, including interaction with a target and SAM
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site. (Lewis, 1987, p. 7) Maneuvering tasks were designated
by an "M" followed by the mission number, and the engagement
tasks were designated by an "E" followed by the mission
number (i.e., M3 for "maneuvering task mission 3", E4 for
"engagement task mission 4"). A complete list of mission




The data for this study were collected from the RAND
Corporation for each of the seventeen mission tasks
performed. After careful consideration, mission M2 was
eliminated from this analysis due to a number of missing data
points, too many to be able to successfully forecast the
missing observations while keeping the data results
"believable." Mission M8 was not utilized in the regression
analysis due to its Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) being of a
different criterion than the other sixteen, though its
effects were considered qualitatively in the overall
analysis. The major MOE for all remaining mission tasks was
"time to maneuver" (measured in seconds) during the critical
phase of each mission; this MOE was chosen since it is
generally considered that the shorter the time in enemy
territory or in a dangerous environment (especially with
enemy SAM's available and active), the greater the chance for
survival. Thus, the quicker the pilot can execute the
maneuver during critical phases, the better.
The regression analysis performed in this thesis
initially involved the basic model of one Dependent (Y)
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Variable and five Independent (X) Variables:
Y-Variable (Dependent) — Maneuver Time
X-Variable (Independent) XI—Helicopter Flight
(All X's Continuous) X2—Fixed Wing Flight Time
X3—Total Simulator Time
X4—Total Tilt Rotor Time
(Discrete) Dl—Combat Experience
As previously stated, the dependent variable is that of
maneuver time while the five independent variables involve
data pertaining to the respective pilots' flight histories.
The objective of the regression is to determine which
independent variables have the most effect on mission
performance. XI and X2 are the amount of hours each pilot
has logged in rotary and fixed-wing aircraft, respectively.
X3 is the total amount of hours flown in both helicopter and
fixed-wing simulators, and X4 is the total amount of
simulator and actual time each pilot has flown in the tilt
rotor aircraft (XV-15) . The only discrete variable, Dl,
determines whether the pilot has had any combat experience.
There was a total of 480 dependent data points, eight for
each run of the simulation (i.e., one per pilot per run) and
thus sixteen total for the two tilt rotor runs and sixteen
for the two helicopter runs encompassing each of the fifteen
mission tasks analyzed. For clarification, the dependent




FORMAT FOR DEPENDENT DATA SET
MISSION NUMBER
TILT ROTOR HELICOPTER














(time) : (time) (time) : (time)
j. j.
The total number of independent data points was fifty (50).
Though technically time-series data, the sample was handled
approximating that of a cross-section, since pilots made only
two sequential runs. The time-series, therefore, is not long
enough to allow estimation of any time-series parameters or
meaningful calculation of any time-series statistics.
B. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The first step in the analysis was to determine whether
the two tilt rotor runs and the two helicopter runs, of eight
observations each, could be combined (pooled) within them-
selves in order to form a larger mission data base to
analyze. This was accomplished by testing for structural
change via the Chow Tests. This method (Johnston, 1984, p.
225) compares a calculated F-value with a tabled F-value. If
the calculated F-value is less than the tabled, then the
hypothesis that the regressions are the same cannot be
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hypothesis that the regressions are the same cannot be
rejected. The equation used is:
(RSS1 - RSS3)/k
Ho: B1=B2 F = ~ F(k,n-2k)
RSS3/(n-2k)
where RSS1 = Residual Sum of Squares (RSS) of Full Regression
RSS3 = Sum of RSS's from the 2 Separate Regressions
k = Number of Constraints on the Model
n = Total Number of Observations in the Combined
Samples
Bl & B2 = Vectors of k Coefficients
For the tilt rotor data on Mission El, the attempt to "pool M
yielded the following: RSS (1st run) = 11.22
RSS (2nd run) = 7.57
RSS3 = 11.22 + 7.57 = 18.79
RSS1 = 23.95
k = 5 and n = 16
Thus,
(23.95 - 18.79)/5
F = = .3295 (calculated F-value)
18.79/(16 - 2*5)
Tabled F-value tor F(5,6) = 4.39 (at the .05 significance
level) Since .3295 < 4.39, one cannot reject the hypothesis
that the regressions are the same, and thus they can be
pooled. Calculated F-values were found to be less than the
tabled F-value for every set of mission data, and thus both
the helicopter and tilt rotor mission data sets were pooled
within themselves. This now provided fuller models of
sixteen observations with which to conduct the analysis.
The next step was to ensure that the mission data sets
did not contain any built-in biases. Using the
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missions' residuals showed no discernible patterns, and the
residuals probability plot for each set of mission data
closely approximated that of a normal. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test was also calculated to ensure that the samples came from
a standard Normal distribution. The results show
conclusively that the sample density function agrees very
closely with the hypothesized density function at a
significance level= .0087 . Discovering no problems in that
area, it was next necessary to check for heteroscedasticity
amidst the mission data. Using the Gold f eld-Quandt test
procedure (Johnston, 1984, p. 301), the sample calculation
for Mission El in the tilt rotor simulator was as follows:
RSS2
R = - F[ (n-c-2*k)/2, (n-c-2*k)/2J
RSS1
where RSS1 = RSS from the Smaller of the Two Regressions
RSS2 = RSS from the Larger of the Two Regressions
n = Total Number of Observations in the Sample
c = Total Number of Central Values Omitted
k = Number of Constraints on the Model
The tilt rotor data from Mission El yielded the following:
RSS1 = .605 RSS2 = 4.80 n=16 c=4 k=5
4.80
r = = 7.934 (Calculated F-value)
.605
Tabled value for F [ (16-4-2*5)/2, (16-4-2*5)/2] = F(l,l) = 16.1
(at the .05 significance level)
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Thus, since 7.934 < 161, one cannot reject the assumption of
homoscedast ic ity . This procedure was repeated for every
mission data set. Calculated F-values were found to be
significantly less than the tabled F-value in every mission,
and thus one could not reject the assumption of
homosc ed as t ic i ty at the five percent level. With
autocorrelation also not a factor, the mission data were felt
to be bias-free and ready for model analysis.
One of the goals of this study was to discern any and all
differences that may exist between the performance of the two
aircraft types. Tilt rotor historical flight data is
practically nonexistent due to the newness of the concept,
especially in the area of operational environments, and
simulators offer the major avenue to obtaining needed
information. The first test, the purpose of which was to
determine if there were in fact differences in aircraft
performance, attempted to pool the data even further,
utilizing again the Chow Test methods. Could the tilt rotor
results be considered the same as that of the helicopter?
The answer in the majority of cases was no. In the fifteen
different missions, only five tests for structural change
concluded that the performances of each type could be




SUMMARY OF ATTEMPT TO POOL HELICOPTER WITH TILT ROTOR
Models which could not be pooled
(Total — 10)
El E2 E3 E4 E6 E7 Ml M3 M6 M10
Models which could be
pooled
(Total — 5)
E5 M4 M5 M7 M9
The results show that 67% of the missions provided an obvious
difference in performance between the two aircraft, while
simultaneously controlling for diverse pilot experience
levels. The majority of these models which could not be
pooled could be categorized as "high maneuverability"
missions, while the pooled models were generally more
concerned with speed (i.e., slalom course and time to dash to
a clearing). These are discussed on page 25 in the paragraph
concerning inter-aircraft differences. Having pared the data
and models as much as possible, the analysis was now focused
on the remaining twenty-five mission data sets. Of these
twenty-five regressions, five were for the pooled mission
data samples and twenty for the non-pooled helicopter/tilt
rotor mission data samples that were discussed above.
A check on the regression data from each mission provided
the main gauge of performance. Each mission time was
modelled against the five independent variables. If the
model produced one or more variables with a significance
level exceeding .15, only the variable with the largest
20
9significance level was dropped from the model. A new
regression was then calculated and again, the variable with
the largest significance level exceeding .15 was dropped from
the model. The "best fit" model was produced and recorded
when the regression contained no variables with significance
levels exceeding this .15 level. A summary of these "best
fit" models is presented in Table 3.
This table shows a split in how well the models fit the
missions. The original model containing the four continuous
and one discrete variable produced ten "best fit" models (40%
of the sample) with R-squared values exceeding .5, which
shows a reasonably good model conformance. Six had models
with R-squared values less than .3. The model producing the
"best of all" fit was Mission E3 (helicopter) with an R-
squared value of .864, while the model with the worst fit was
Mission M4, where no combination of variables could produce
any variable significance levels below .30.
The variable that was least significant to the models was
X3, corresponding to total simulator time. It added a con-
tribution in only eight of the twenty-five models, and five
of these were negative correlations with the dependent vari-
able. The variable most significant was X4, corresponding to
2
'The value .15 is used as the cutoff standard since a
regressed variable with a significance level exceeding this
amount contributes little or nothing to the model.
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TABLE 3
BEST FIT MODELS FOR EACH MISSION
ENGAGEMENT



























TIME= 1.290 - .00051*X2 + .00649*X3 + 2.0096*D1
(.9920) (.00021) (.00331) (.52737)
TIME= 6.13375 - .00033*X1
(.70343) (.000163)
TIME= 4.156 4+.00112*X1+.02 919*X3+.12313*X4-3.576*D1
(2.6316) (.00034) (.00736) (.02392) (.97909)
TIME= 6.55097 + .00036*Xl
(1.9681) (.00046)
TIME= 13.096+.000 99*X1+.00167*X2+.10349*X4-9.7 85*D1
(.9399) (.00029) (.00041) (.02084) (1.2275)
TIME= 9.26 01+.0006 3*X2-.00 533*X3-.00 57 4*X4-2.216*D1
(.8931) (.00028) (.00289) (.00141) (.75949)
TIME= 16.7 99+.0016 9*X1-.0007 9*X2+.114 86*X4-1.316*D1
(2.442) (.00076) (.00107) (.05416) (3.1894)
TIME= 15.403 + .00155*X1 - .01936*X4 - 2.5219*D1
(1.257) (.00048) (.00523) (1.2227)
TIME= 16.259 + .00136*X1 - .00119*X2 - .01678*X4
(1.297) (.00043) (.00045) (.00559)
TIME= 1.631 + .00015*X2 - ,60341*D1
(.1275) (.000087) (.22617)
TIME= 2.6877 - .00015*X1 + .00034*X2 - 1.7089*Dl
(.3121) (.00007) (.00016) (.42674)
TIME= 23.989 + .00197*X2
(1.1429) (.00061)





























TIME= 5.9585 + .00166*X1 + .06613*X4
(1.4138) (.00041) (.02728)
TIME= 14.487 + .00139*X1 - .01907*X3 - .01166*X4
(1.1298) (.00025) (.00346) (.00287)
TIME= 7.813 + .00123*X2 + .10769*X4 - 3.2428*D1
(1.045) (.00069) (.03384) (1.9529)
TIME= 9.504 - ,000052*X2 - .00218*X4 - .15611*D1
(.60249) (.00041) (.00196) (1.0218)
NO GOOD FIT COULD BE ACHIEVED
TIME= 11.3687 + .00057*X1 - ,00706*X4
(.40111) (.00013) (.00178)
TIME= 26.125 + .00091*X1 - .02949*X3 + .04002*X4
(3.350) (.00039) (.00936) (.02744)
TIME= 23.315-.00121*X2-.01439*X3: 00485*X4+2. 665*Dl
(1.705) (.00054) (.00552) (.00268) (1,4498)
TIME=17.946-.00144*X2+.00 865*X3-.0072 8*X4+3.530 3*D1
(1.672) (.00047) (.00562) (.00325) (1.1924)
TIME= 104.015 - .03733*X3
(3.6351) (.01162)
TIME= 9.1615 + .0009*X1
(.8138) (.00026)
TIME= 8.1193 + .00544*X4
(1.1255) (.00519)
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tilt rotor time; it was contained in fifteen of the models
and eight times was a positive contributor. This is
intuitive when considering the complexity of transitioning to
a new aircraft concept. Immediately following (in level of
significance), was variable XI (helicopter flight time),
found in fourteen of the "best fit" models. Eleven of these
were positive correlations, which was the most of any
variable. Both Dl (combat experience) and X2 (fixed-wing
flight time) were involved in the model fit 48% of the time
(in 12 of 25 models). Ten of the Dl variables were nega-
tively correlated, while X2 was split evenly (six for each)
between positive and negative contributions to the dependent
variable. No independent variable was found overwhelmingly
more often in either the helicopter or tilt rotor missions
"best fit". The model that occurred most often (6 of 25) was
simply C + XI . Summarizing these findings, it is seen that
helicopter and tilt rotor flight times were the two most
positively significant independent variables to this type of
flight simulation. For future studies, then, these pilot
backgrounds should possibly be considered as most appealing
when attempting to choose amongst a variety of candidates.
Total simulator flight time was the least significant.
Combat experience was a negative contributor in terms of the
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performance measure in 83.3% of the models in which it was
found
.
In terms of inter-aircraft differences, a few trends from
the regressions were noted, which coincide with some of the
findings by the RAND Corporation. While neither the tilt
rotor nor the helicopter proved superior in every case, Table
3 shows that certain missions did show a distinct advantage
to one or the other. The tilt rotor performed better in
maneuvers requiring hard, maximum effort turns, as in
Missions E7 and M10, and in maneuvers requiring firing at
targets in depressed positions (Missions E2 and E3) . The
helicopter was faster in maneuvers requiring quick lateral
movements and rapid hover-up/hover-down procedures, as in the
times it was necessary to escape missile lock-on by the enemy
(i.e., Missions Ml, El, and E6) . Rapid hover maneuvers would
be inhibited in the tilt rotor partly because of the
increased drag on the airframe caused by the wings. There
was no discernible difference in the accelerations to 120
knots (since the tilt rotor and helicopter data from Mission
M5 could be pooled) ; this result would most likely have been
changed in the tilt rotor's favor if a greater airspeed had
been desired. However, the NASA Ames simulator was unable to
accurately model proper power and rotor limitations above
that airspeed, and thus missions were tailored accordingly.
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Taking the point of airspeed one step further, it is the
one major advantage of the tilt rotor over the helicopter
that is not shown by the data. In the scenarios offered
here, speed did not prove extremely important, but in battle
situations, it is essential . "Speed is life" is a popular
and legitimate fixed-wing community saying. Whether flying
off the ship or going inland from the beach, speed (1)
enhances the ability to surprise the enemy, (2) reduces enemy
reaction time, (3) increases sortie production, and (4)
increases survivability in today's modern battlefield. Due
to its over-the-hor izon launching ability, ship protection
will be enhanced as well. Maybe even more importantly, U. S.
Marine Corps Colonel W. R. Gage wrote that the tilt rotor
would provide greater tactical flexibility and give the
United States the advantage of modern technology to ensure
that U.S. weapons systems are superior, in quality if not in
quantity, to those of the enemy. (Gage, 1984, p. 1) The tilt
rotor certainly should warrant some consideration in future
tactical acquisitions, if not in the LHX program itself.
Finally, inter-pilot differences were examined. Did the
Army pilots perform better in the combat scenarios, or did
the tilt rotor experience of the industry pilots influence
the better performances in their direction? Analysis began
by immediately combining the two runs for each mission due to
the limited number of observations available. The eight
observations for the four Army pilots per mission were then
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modelled against the five independent variables as before.
Initial regressions found that both the X4 and Dl variables
were linear combinations of other independent variables and
had to be eliminated. Thus, the model became the eight
observations of the dependent variable versus the three
independent variables XI, X2, and X3. Identical procedures
were performed for the industry pilots.
For the helicopter model, this method proved to be
plausible. Chow test F-tests were calculated, this time to
determine whether the Army pilots' helicopter performance was
significantly different than the industry pilots' performance
in this study. Of the fifteen missions, only mission M9 (the
slalom course) had a calculated F-test greater than the
tabled F-value (46.06 > 9.28). The mission data set for M9
could not be pooled and thus was the only helicopter mission
to reveal a flight performance difference between the pilot
communities. A close look at the raw data shows that,
surprisingly, the industry pilots performed this maneuver
more proficiently with a lower mean completion time! Due to
the tactical nature of the maneuver and recalling the flying
requirements in their present professional duties, expecta-
tions would lead to the opposite conclusion.
The tilt rotor model, however, was not as satisfactory.
Due to the structure of the flight history data, X4 and Dl
were again linear combinations of the other independent
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variables and thus could not be included in the model. This
is unfortunate because the results would be more meaningful
if tilt rotor performance could be modelled as a function of
tilt rotor experience. Instead, the independent variables
were again XI, X2 and X3, modelling tilt rotor time against
helicopter, fixed-wing, and total simulator flight time. The
resultant regressions also produced only one mission whose
data could not be pooled (F-test 9.57 > 9.28). Mission E2
(engaging a 12 degree depressed target and evading through
the pass) was performed significantly faster in the tilt
rotor by the Army pilots which again is a big surprise, since
the industry pilots had notably more tilt rotor flight
experience and would be expected to excel in that arena.
Overall, however, the performances of the Army and industry
pilots were not significantly different. Further studies
into individual performances might show that some pilots
performed better than others, but as a community, the
abilities were reasonably the same.
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IV. QUESTIONNAIRE AND RESPONSES
In addition to analyzing the raw data for information,
questionnaires were sent to the ten pilots who had
participated in the RAND study. Replies, either via the
survey or by telephone, were received from nine of them, the
tenth pilot being unavailable in the Far East. A copy is
presented in Appendix D. The questionnaire was broken down
into the following areas:
- Flight History
Comments About the Simulator Used
Hardest Mechanical Differences to Transition to When
Converting From a Helicopter to the Tilt Rotor
Hardest Maneuvers to Master in the Tilt Rotor
- Comments About the Study and Tilt Rotor
What Automation the LHX Needs Most
- Should the LHX/Tilt Rotor be a One or Two-Man Airframe
The first five areas, along with comments by the pilots, will
now be discussed in order. The final two are incorporated
into Chapter V.
A. FLIGHT HISTORY
This information was utilized as the needed data for the
regression analysis independent variables.
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B. COMMENTS ABOUT THE SIMULATOR USED
A simulator is a useful tool. It creates a means by
which to compare two models, providing a reasonable environ-
ment for a generic flight simulation. The importance of this
section is to ascertain what areas of simulator flying can be
considered most and least accurate in terms of data collec-
tion. When trying to assimilate simulator data to that of
the real aircraft, certain ideas where variability may occur
must be kept in mind. Some data points can prove to be
exaggerated due to inconsistencies or limitations in the
simulator. This section focuses on where the pilots felt
that weaknesses or inconsistencies occurred and what biases
should possibly be considered when contemplating the
simulator results.
In general, the simulator was considered adequate in its
flying performance by all the pilots, with the mean rating
just over five on a scale of one to ten. The limited field-
of-view (LFOV) did, however, affect their flying abilities,
especially in the severe-type maneuvers such as high-speed
low-level turns, quick stops, and low-speed Nap-of-the-Earth
(NOE) 3 tasks. The tilt rotor was less affected by this due
3NOE is low-level (less than 50 feet AGL) terrain flying
where the pilot flies via the contours of the earth. It is
one of the most demanding environments in which to operate
due to aircraft speed and the close proximity to obstacles
and the ground. Quick stops are precise maneuvers that
involve decelerating to a hover while maintaining constant
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to its ability to maintain a more level body attitude during
acceleration or deceleration, just one of the new aerodynamic
advantages introduced by the tilt rotor due to the nacelles
'
ability to tilt forward. Table 5 presents evidence of this
in Mission M6 (a forward quick stop) —the regressions show
that the aircraft types are significantly different, with the
raw data indicating tilt rotor times and maximum pitch angles
significantly less than those of the helicopter. Helicopter
performance in mission E4 was also adversely affected by the
LFOV. Since the optimal path (in this particular maneuver)
was to maintain terrain height in order to avoid radar
detection, terrain visual cues would be obscured if
aggressive accelerations were flown during egress. (Lewis,
1987, p. 10) Maneuver times again were significantly less in
the tilt rotor.
Every pilot felt that they flew more aggressively in the
simulator than in the real aircraft and the data supports
this view. This was explained by one aviator to be "due to
lack of motion feedback provided by simulators", and another
"due to lack of visual cues which generally force the pilot
to achieve greater rates and displacements before control
feedback is noted." NASA Ames noted that in this study,




pilots were occasionally found to be at a 45-to-60 degree
nose-down attitude when safety-of-f light considerations in a
real aircraft would generally require a maximum of 30-to-45
degree nose displacement. However, exceeding these limits is
easy to do since simulators will not break if the maximum G-
limit is exceeded. Also, the loss of peripheral vision due
to LFOV limits one's situational awareness of both attitude
and obstacles in many situations. Detrimental effects on
depth perception is a big problem, too.
C. HARDEST MECHANICAL DIFFICULTIES TO TRANSITION TO WHEN
CONVERTING FROM A HELICOPTER TO A TILT ROTOR
With the advent of the V-22 Osprey into the operational
fleet expected to occur in 1991, it will be crucial for those
individuals tasked with providing instructions to future
Osprey pilots to be aware of the areas of flight that will
prove most difficult during the transition period. Certainly
it will depend on the pilots' background as to what may be
the hardest--an experienced helicopter pilot will have
different problem areas than, say, a Harrier pilot or a
"nugget" pilot fresh out of flight school. Thus, background
should be the main quantifier for the areas in which to
expect the least and most difficulties. Careful considera-
tion of these problem areas could greatly decrease safety
problems and accident rates, while simultaneously speeding
pilot transition completion time and increasing his technical
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knowledge of this state-of-the-art aircraft. The following
paragraphs discuss the areas that the ten helicopter pilots
in the RAND study found the most difficult during their
transition.
While no single transitional domain was unanimously
considered the most difficult, three problem areas were
continually addressed. They were (1) nacelle operations
(including the conversion corridor), (2) the Lateral
Translation Mode (LTM) and, (3) the "throttle versus
collective" concept. The third point, though not a problem
in this study, will be discussed because it was noted by
nearly every pilot, and its possible effect on the Osprey was
regarded as a major cause of concern. All agreed that the
problems were more mental than physical, and that mastering
the new systems was just a function of the time spent in the
aircraft. Therefore, none of the transitions were felt to be
overwhelming. It was reported that it was difficult, though,
getting used to operating the nacelles, using them to gain
forward airspeed (or hover in reverse) while maintaining the
same pitch attitude, when the pilot had extensive flight
experience in helicopters. In that regime, flying in a level
attitude while accelerating simply is not natural, since
normally the nose of the aircraft would be well below the
horizon. New thought processes and motor skills are
unquestionably required. Expanding further, the "conversion
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corridor" deals with converting from helicopter to fixed-wing
mode and will be awkward for all pilots, regardless of their
background, since no other aircraft offers this concept.
Where to stop tilting the nacelles in the to 90 degree
range-of-mot ion for a desired attitude and airspeed will
certainly take practice. Pilots with fixed-wing backgrounds
may initially have more difficulty here due to unfamiliarity
at airspeeds below 80 knots. Also, the LTM's will certainly
require practice, but is a useful system. Its function,
operated by a simple conical momentary position switch, is to
help one fly laterally with more ease and little stick
movement by readjusting the cant of the rotor blades while
maintaining a level aircraft attitude. Practice should help
the pilots easily integrate this into their flying
fundamentals. With the importance of these systems and the
number of times they are used in flight, these switches
should be conveniently configured on the collective/power
lever for reduced pilot workload.
The largest problem, though, and this depends on what
communities the Osprey pilots are from, may be caused by the
new throttle in the V-22. If the pilots are former Harrier
pilots (since this throttle system is used in AV-8's), it
will feel natural, though hovering for long periods of time
as required by the Osprey mission may not. Harrier pilots
wanting to convert to a slower and less maneuverable aircraft
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appears to be a doubtful proposition, however. If the pilots
are recent flight school graduates, they can be taught the
new system and be comfortable with it from the start. The
negative aspect of this, though, is that they have had no
operational experience in the fleet. Finally, since the
Osprey is performing a helicopter mission— it's just doing
the mission faster due to its speed--and is projected to
replace many types of helicopters, it seems logical to pool
the pilots from the helicopter community. Concerning pilots
with a helicopter background, however, initial problems with
the throttle configuration will invariably occur.
Helicopters utilize a collective which, in basic terms, is
raised when an altitude increase is required, and lowered for
an altitude decrease. With considerations toward human
factors, this is intuitively logical and correct. The
throttle configuration, however, is basically the opposite of
the collective, and may prove extremely difficult to
transition to. The problems will occur, unfortunately, when
instinctive actions are necessary (as in an emergency
situation) and pilots unconsciously revert to the original
collective mode of operation. For obvious safety reasons,
emphasis in this area cannot be overstressed by the training
commands. The only other major difference that was noted by
the pilots was the difference in thrust responses of the two
aircraft, to which they became adjusted after initial
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practice flights. In terms of all other human factors
considerations, each pilot felt that all controls and
displays were generally optimally located.
D. HARDEST MANEUVERS TO MASTER IN THE TILT ROTOR
As in the previous section, this information will be
important to those instructors teaching new Osprey pilots how
to fly while in the training squadrons, and will hopefully
give them an idea as to (1) where to expect the most problems
and (2) where to be the most safety-conscious.
The two specific aircraft flight performance maneuvers
that were felt to cause the most initial problems were (1)
stabilizing at a specified airspeed and (2) altitude control.
Due to this, performing quick stops were very difficult
because of the tendency to nballoon M (gain a lot of altitude)
during the execution. Mission M6 again can be seen to
support this. Operationally, NOE flight was seen to be the
hardest to execute. This is because the aircraft response is
sluggish compared to the helicopter, and "tweaking" the
nacelles forward or back to keep a constant attitude is
difficult to master. The tilt rotor is not as maneuverable
in low altitude regimes (as in valleys) and is made primarily
for a "dash and leave" type of scenario. This can explain
why the data in Mission M9 (the slalom course) could be
pooled (which suggests that the results are about the same)
.
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The tilt rotor would be expected to negotiate the course
faster than the helicopter because of its speed superiority,
but is only equal to its counterpart in this mission due to
the greater inherent maneuverability of the helicopter and
the comparative sluggishness of the tilt rotor in the roll
and yaw axes. One of the greatest advantages evident in the
tilt rotor, however, was felt to be its ability to fire at a
depressed or elevated target while simultaneously flying
rearward, a maneuver aer odynamically impossible in a
helicopter (since nose down to fire in a helicopter implies
forward airspeed and thus movement toward the target).
Though performing this maneuver is initially difficult due to
its uniqueness, this tilt rotor advantage is significant in
that it severely decreases escape time, thus increasing
survivability. This tactic was observed in Missions E2 and
E3 and is summarized in Table 4. Note the large differences
in Evasive Maneuver (EM) times. This difference is due to
the airspeed when the evasive maneuver began. As can be
seen, the tilt rotor aircraft is nearly hovering in Mission
E2 and actually flying rearward in Mission E3 at EM time, and
thus in essence is already beginning his escape. The differ-
ences in all airspeeds here are very significant for survival
purposes, and it is here that the tilt rotor is felt to be
far superior to the helicopter. This point was noted not
only by the pilots but by RAND (Veit, 1988, p. 57) as well.
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TABLE 4
TILT ROTOR AND HELICOPTER COMPARISON IN TASKS E2 AND E3
Maneuver Helicopter Tilt Rotor
E2/E3 E2/E3
Change in fwd airspeed 41.0/34.7 0.3/-15.9
from target acquisition
to firing (in knots)
Airspeed at EM 46.7/43.9 8.9/-7.9
(in knots)
Time from start of EM
to breaking target LOS 15.9/14.1 7.9/6.8
(in seconds)
Other maneuvers such as acceleration and deceleration,
pitch attitude, pedal turns and yaw control were discussed.
All were felt to be equally challenging and would require
some transition time, but were generally not overly
demand ing
.
E. COMMENTS ABOUT THE TILT ROTOR AND SIMULATOR
This section presents general opinions of the pilots
pertaining to the study and to the tilt rotor aircraft.
Overall, the pilots were very favorable in their
attitudes toward the tilt rotor aircraft. This is signifi-
cant because the sample includes industry pilots who came
from aeronautical corporations who compete with Bell, and who
had initial skepticism as to the capabilities of the tilt
rotor. On the negative side, all did note the XV-15's
sluggishness in the roll and yaw axes. One pilot likened its
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performance characteristics to "a large barbell" in these
axes. This is due to the heavy weight of the engines,
transmissions, rotors and hydraulics on the wingtips
producing high inertia about the longitudinal and vertical
axes. Other than that, though, all comments were positive.
They felt that the tilt rotor was more stable in a hover than
the helicopter and was equal to the turboprop in its flying
characteristics when in the airplane mode. The tilt rotor
aircraft also cannot be stalled "power on", which alleviates
that worry during transition. All felt that the tilt rotor
must have a Heads Up Display (HUD) in the cockpit for
workload management, and that both the nacelle tilt switch
and the LTM control switch should be placed on the
collective/power lever for ease of use. All also felt that
the tilt rotor took much too long to decelerate from the
airplane mode airspeed to the helicopter mode airspeed which
necessitated the addition of a speed brake. The V-22 has
already adopted this conception.
As for the study itself, one pilot felt that even the
actual flight experience he had was not enough for him to
operate at a maximum effective level in the LHX—there is
just too much to do to stay abreast of the continually
changing situation. They unanimously felt that the RAND
Corporation had conducted a meaningful and professional study
and were glad to be a part of it. Cockpit designs and the
39
automation provided were adequate indicators of what should
be provided by the LHX
.
The next two sections of the questionnaire dealt with
answering the issues of "what automation the LHX needs most"
and "should the LHX be a one or two-man airframe." The
following chapter deals specifically with these questions and
contains pilot opinions.
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V. ONE-MAN VERSUS TWO-MAN CONFIGURATION
The second most important question to be analyzed before
production of the LHX commences, after aircraft type, is
whether the aircraft will be developed with a one or two-seat
configuration. The Army is interested in a single seat model
because it offers the following potential benefits: (1) a
more compact size which increases maneuverability and
survivability, (2) a decrease in required manpower, and (3)
lower costing in all areas, including training, manpower,
production, operating and life cycle costs. These desires
can be found as factors in most programs and are obviously
appealing and feasible ways to save money. The aircraft will
be lighter with only one pilot (the projection is approxi-
mately 15%) and more maneuverable, thus performance should be
better. However, consider the mission of the LHX. It has a
primary role as an anti-armor weapon system that must be able
to execute combat missions in any weather, day or night. The
pilot must be able to reconnoiter and contact enemy elements,
hand-off targets to other scout/attack elements, help select
firing positions, and engage enemy targets, in addition to
flying the aircraft. These tasks require that the pilot
supervise or control the following: (1) data management and
transfer systems, (2) flight control, navigation, guidance
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and communication systems, (3) target acquisition and
designation systems, (4) weapon systems, (5) threat
identification system and (6) electronic countermeasure (ECM)
systems (Hickman, 1985, p. 3). Can a single pilot
effectively perform with that workload? Add to all this the
likelihood of executing these while flying at tree-top level
utilizing Nap-of -the-Earth (NOE) techniques in all weather
conditions while avoiding obstacles and probable enemy fire.
(Hickman, 1985, p. 3) The stress of combat and fatigue after
days of continuous flying can only further degrade
performance. Can one man handle it all?
To help deal with this workload problem, the Army is
planning to equip the LHX with highly automated subsystems.
A partial list includes: (1) an increased number of sensors
and target acquisition aids, (2) improved navigation and
communication systems, (3) advanced crew station design, (4)
improved flight controls, and (5) extraordinary avionics
reliability, self-healing components, functional redundancies
and reconf igurable features (Aldrich, 1984, p. 13) . Though
the advanced systems will cost more than present ones, Army
officials feel high system reliability and single crew
operation will eventually make them cost effective. Their
pervasive feeling is that a single pilot will be able to
handle the LHX and its multi-purpose role effectively with
all of the increased automation. This, then, demands that
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two areas be explored at this point: the two-seat aircraft
configuration, and the workload now placed on the pilot with
this advanced automation. These now follow in order.
History has shown, with concepts dating as far back as
the two-man foxhole, that soldiers fight more aggressively
and effectively as a team (Hickman, 1985, p. 38). This is
not to imply, though, that a two-seat aircraft does not have
disadvantages. The obvious negative is that weight is
increased, thus reducing maneuverability, range, climb rate,
speed and service ceiling, while increasing fuel consumption.
Life cycle costs are also higher, and required manpower is
doubled with two pilots. These are certainly areas that
require consideration when approaching program development.
But despite its disadvantages, a two seat configuration can
be the more beneficial and most studies recommend it.
First, statistics from the Naval Safety Center in
Norfolk, Virginia, show that a two-seat F-4 has a lifetime
mishap rate of 2.77 (per 100,000 hours) versus 4.79 for the
single seat F-8; the twin seat A-6 has only a 1.52 mishap
rate versus 2.66 for the single seat A-7. Plus, only five of
the A-6 mishaps were due to pilot error, while 41 pilot error
mishaps occurred in the A-7 (Hickman, 1985, p. 32).
Regarding the above data, it was found that pilot error
usually occurred because the pilot's attention was focused
elsewhere. He failed to perceive an emergency situation
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approaching or occurring, and was consequently slow or late
in reacting to proper procedures. This type of problem is
severely diminished in a two-pilot situation, where the
second crewman relieves the first pilot from a number of
duties, thus reducing his workload and allowing him to
concentrate more on flying the aircraft. Though this data
pertains to fixed-wing aircraft, it is hard to imagine the
added safety factor of a second crewman not holding for the
rotary-winged environment as well. As for cost— if just one
aircraft is saved in a flight of five due to the second pilot
sighting an enemy threat or an unsafe condition, then he has
successfully helped "pay" for all life cycle costs that would
have been incurred due to the extra seat (Hickman, 1985, p.
39). This implies that a two-seater can be more cost-
effective from the aspect of flight safety, and is even more
so during combat (vs. peacetime) situations. It is also safe
to assume that the probability of survival will increase with
experience level. Thus, an inexperienced pilot teamed with
an experienced aviator in a dual-configured aircraft would
have a greater chance for survival than if he were alone in a
single seat aircraft.
Realizing that there are major trade-offs involved, the
U.S. Army has conducted numerous studies on this subject.
One of these such studies occurred in July 1983 at Fort
Rucker, Alabama. The Army Research Institute (ARI) Field
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Unit was tasked to (1) evaluate the feasibility of single-
pilot LHX mission performance, and (2) help identify the
automation that would be most beneficial in mission
accomplishment (Aldrich, 1984, p. 3). Twenty-nine
representative LHX scout and attack mission segments were
devised and analyzed for excessive workload, with the
workload components broken down into four areas: visual,
auditory, cognitive, and psychomotor. A chart (Aldrich,
1984, p. 18) detailing all workload activities analyzed can
be found in Appendix E. Table 5 presents the results
detailing where the workload overloads occurred (Aldrich,
1984, p. 48). As can be seen, the single pilot configuration
produced 263 overload conditions, while two-pilot configura-
tions produced only 43, 83.6% less. Another result was that
40 of the 43 overloads in the two-pilot crew were experi-
enced by the copilot. This makes sense when it is realized
that the pilot handles the flight controls while the copilot
performs the support and mission functions. Further results
concerning the one-pilot configuration included: (1) no audi-
tory overloads, (2) 1.5 more visual overloads than cognitive,
and (3) greater than 2.5 times as many psychomotor overloads
than visual. Thus, overloads were not distributed equally
over the four workload components (Aldrich, 1984, p. 50)
.
For the two-pilot configuration, overloads decreased greatly
and were equally distributed over three of the workload
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TABLE 5
FREQUENCY OF OVERLOAD CONDITIONS BY MISSION SEGMENTS
Segment TITLE
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25 Engagement From Masked Position
26 Engagement, Running Fire, Cannon
27 Engagement, Running Fire, Missile
28 Handoff Aerial Threat, Voice







TOTAL OVERLOAD CONDITIONS 263 43
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components (visual, cognitive, and psychomotor), but again,
no auditory overloads occurred. From the one-pilot config-
uration to the dual, visual overloads decreased 70%,
cognitive decreased 69%, and psychomotor dropped 93%
(Aldrich, 1984, p. 52) . Also observe from Table 5 that many
overloads in the one-man design no longer exist in the dual
design. More importantly, it can be seen that the majority
of the overloads could possibly be eliminated by providing
automated flight control and target acquisition systems,
since only segments 2 and 26 do not require at least one of
these (Aldrich, 1984, p. 67). The ARI summary ultimately
found that the two-seat LHX was overwhelmingly preferred.
Many of these tasks in the two-piloted scenario (14 of 29)
could be performed without overload and without the help of
automation, and only three pilot tasks caused overloads
without automation. It is evident that with automation,
performance would improve even more. The results here are
also helpful in gaining an appreciation of what areas of
automation are needed most if a one-seat configuration is
indeed pursued.
Another study, this one by the U.S. Air Force, evaluated
five different crewstation configurations and mission
equipment packages utilizing a previously proven technique
known as SWAT (Subjective Workload Assessment Technique)
(Hickman, 1985, p. 6) . The success of this technique occurs
by allowing the experience and knowledge of the operational
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pilots used to aid in determining the optimal crewstation
design. The mission task analysis began with a review of 24
LHX mission profiles to determine the critical mission
segments that have the greatest impact on aviator workload
(Hickman, 1985, p. 8) Within each of these mission profiles,
twenty-nine mission segments were chosen for analysis, with
six of these segments selected as critical points at which to
collect workload estimates. These six were: (1)
reconnaissance, (2) pre-Forward Line of Troops (FLOT) , (3)
FLOT penetration, (4) approach to battle position, (5) air-
to-ground target acquisition and engagement, and (6) air-to-
air target acquisition and engagement (Hickman, 1985, p. 9).
The subjects were Army pilots with varying backgrounds and
experience levels to judge personal workload requirements.
In addition, interviews with operational pilots from the four
major services were conducted to gain further insight of
crewstation configuration as well as the equipment and
technologies to be utilized. Again, workload components were
broken down into visual, auditory, cognitive and psychomotor.
The first analysis was completed without automation, the
second with automation, and the results were as follows: For
the one-man/no automation aircraft, the pilots experienced
overloads in all twenty-nine segments, while the two-man/no
automation aircraft produced fifteen overloads, a 48.3% drop;
on the fully automated analysis, no overloads were identified
in the two-man crew, while two overloads occurred in the
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single seat aircraft in the critical segments of "air-to-
ground target engagement" and "reconnaissance".
Once again, the summary was the same. Single crewmembers
will experience overloads during critical segments, with a
second crewmember eliminating them in a fully automated
system. With less-than-full automation, crew overloads can
be expected to increase (Hickman, 1985, p. 8). Another
important outcome was that workload was greatly reduced when
a wide f ield-of-vision was present in cockpit design. Thus,
a wide f ield-of-vision (90-120 degrees) should be considered
critical in either the one qjl two-man design, since it
improves target acquisition by improving accuracy and
decreasing acquisition time. This correlates well with
Chapter IV, Section B findings, where limited field-of-
vision affected the quick stops and NOE flight maneuvers, and
high-speed low-level turns.
What are the pilots' opinions? From the survey of the
RAND study participants, all were unanimous in their support
for a two-seat LHX due to workload reduction. In the words
of one, "Two brains are four times better than one, and four
eyes are sixteen times better than two!" Another felt that
two were needed due to advanced system requirements and since
workload is higher with the "high tech" glass cockpits. A
few did feel, however, that with some extremely state-of-the-
art systems, it may very well be possible to build a single
seat version that could be effective. While some tasks did
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prove overwhelming for one pilot, other tasks were an
"overkill" with two. Discovering this "ideal" model, if one
exists, is one of the Army's main goals with its present
testing for the LHX , to find if it is indeed operationally
feasible. It is also possible that projected population
demographics and escalating training costs will actually
d ictate a migration to this type configuration in the not-
too-distant future. Since the second crewmember in tactical
operations is primarily required to navigate while the pilot
flies, automatic navigation and waypoint steering systems may
help eliminate their need. The pilot's main requirement
would then be to operate the weapons systems. This implies
that today's challenge is to develop adequate warning and
weapons systems to both protect the aircraft and to perform
the targeting tasks for the pilot. An abbreviated list of
other pilots' inputs, many of which support the findings of
the above studies, have helped determine that the following
functions are critical in a fully automated system: (1)
voice interactive systems, (2) automatic navigation, (3)
automatic target detection, acquisition, tracking and
recognition, (4) automatic threat analysis and management,
(5) terrain follow/terrain avoidance, (6) integrated fire,
flight, flight engine and flight path controls, (7) a wide
field of-vision and (8) artificial intelligence concepts. If
it turns out that the LHX is. a tilt rotor, it will be further
enhanced by the automatic flaps, conversion corridor
50
protection and automatic RPM governing systems that the
Osprey will possess. These all will certainly help the
aircraft survivability. A major question, though, is whether
these above-desired technologies will be mature enough in the
time frame desired by the U.S. Army to be incorporated into
the LHX to help reduce crew workload. Voice interactive
systems, for one, are important but are currently incapable
of the large vocabulary needed to be integrated fully into
mission accomplishment. What systems will or will not be
available to be utilized will play a major role in the Army's
ultimate decision on the LHX. Maintainability of these
systems will also be a factor, as it will require highly-
skilled maintenance personnel to keep abreast of this new
technology. This, of course, increases already high training
and personnel costs as well.
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VI . CONCLUSIONS
It should be clear that there are a myriad of
considerations necessary in procuring a system such as the
LHX
. These decisions are tedious and necessarily time-
consuming; however, as the process is extended, the useful
life of the existing light helicopter fleet continues to
diminish. Many choices, as discussed within this thesis, are
available for the LHX in terms of airframe types, cockpit
configuration, design, and automation. High acquisition costs
will, as usual, be a major factor in the ultimate decision,
as the force size per fixed budget is optimized. The tilt
rotor, though ruled out by initial studies, possibly should
still be considered as a candidate, as the success of the XV-
15 has removed significant uncertainty by proving the tilt
rotor concept. The V-22 Osprey is much too large for the LHX
mission, but a scaled-down model, one the size of the XV-15,
may be feasible. The data from the RAND Corporation study
revealed that the tilt rotor performed better in the missions
requiring (1) hard, maximum effort turns and (2) firing at
elevated or depressed targets. The helicopter, in turn, has
the advantage in lateral movements and quick hover up/hover
down maneuvers, such as when trying to escape missile lock-
on. The U.S. Army must take the advantages and disadvantages
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of each aircraft, plus the expected enemy threat beyond the
year 2000, into account when reviewing the desired tasks of
the LHX to best assess the characteristics needed to perform
and survive the LHX mission.
The views brought forth in this thesis hope to provoke
ideas regarding what should or should not be considered not
only for the LHX but for future aviation acquisitions as
well, plus the benefits and disadvantages that they impose.
The helicopter pilot opinions disclosed within this thesis
offered that particular group's views regarding what issues
they felt were most important. These views may be
significantly different from another cross-section of pilots.
Pilot opinion conclusions pertaining to which systems and
maneuvers were most difficult for helicopter pilots'
attempting a tilt rotor transition were clear and distinct,
while the differences in performance by pilot communities




The Bell-Boeing Tilt Rotor aircraft (being produced as a
team effort) has been designated a mult i-miss ion/mult i-
service program that is scheduled to be operationally
introduced to the fleet in the early 1990's. It is an
extremely versatile airframe that has given high hopes to
procurement personnel in many aviation programs, and can
arguably be considered the most advanced technological
breakthrough in the aviation field in decades. The
advantages of the program is its reduced research and
development costs due to joint efforts amongst the services,
and the Bell-Boeing team effort which has exploited a broader
technology base for its design (Gage, 1984, p. 15). Its
original conception actually occurred over thirty years ago
when Bell Helicopter tested the XV-3 (a tilt rotor of sorts)
back in 1955. Despite some serious aeroelastic stability
problems (it came apart during a wind tunnel test!), the
program provided great promise for the future. In the late
1960's, engineers felt that they had solved the XV-3
instability problems, and after funding approval, Bell (under
contract to NASA Ames) commenced development of the XV-15.
Its first successful flight, in 1977, "proved the concept" of
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the tilt rotor and has opened the door for the production and
design of the V-22 Osprey. It is important to note, though,
that the XV-15 is not a prototype for the Osprey— in fact, it
was constructed primarily from "off-the-shelf" technology.
Thus, very little of this hardware will be present in the
Osprey upon its completion.
Engineering-wise, the tilt rotor aircraft has two three-
bladed proprotors mounted onto wingtip engine nacelles,
giving the appearance of "a fixed-wing aircraft with
helicopter rotors." These nacelles operate from angles of
degrees (the horizontal position in front of the wings) to a
95 degree position, 5 degrees past the vertical
configuration. Basic operation is such that the aircraft
takes off vertically much like a helicopter with the
rotors/nacelles in the 90 degree position. There is a limit
to how fast the aircraft can fly in this configuration (thus
the limitation in the conventional helicopter), so the
nacelles "tilt" forward to the horizontal position, or may be
stopped anywhere in between. This area "in between" is known
as the conversion corridor, the conversion from the 90 degree
vertical "helicopter" position to the degree full-forward
"airplane" position. The 95 degree position is provided to
enable the tilt rotor to fly backwards in much the same
manner as a helicopter. The usual fixed-wing control
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surfaces (i.e., flaps, ailerons) are operable, but
ineffective, at low airspeeds.
Hopes for the future of the Osprey have been so high that
three of the four major services plan to acquire a total of
657 of these tilt rotor aircraft to replace existing rotary
and fixed-wing platforms. They will be used to perform the
following missions:
U.S. Marine Corps—Medium Amphibious Assault while replac-
ing the workhouse CH-46 (medium assault helicopter) and the
CH-53A/D. One of the Marines' primary missions is rapid
movement of ground troops, which is suited perfectly to the
tilt rotor's vertical takeoff and landing capabilities and
its forward flight speed and range. The Marine Corps plans
to purchase 552 aircraft;
Navv—Combat Search and Rescue (SAR) , Special Warfare, and
Fleet Logistics Support Missions. Purchase amount is fifty
(50) . aircraft to replace the HH-3;
Air Force--Lonq-Ranae Placement and Special Operations.
Plans are to procure fifty-five (55) aircraft to replace the
HH-53 and HH-60.
The fourth major service, the U.S. Army, had desired to
acquire 231 Ospreys as well, but recently dropped these plans
due to budgetary considerations.
The capabilities of the V-22 Osprey will include in-
flight refueling to drastically improve mission range, and an
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advanced "Fly-by-Wire" flight control system, utilizing
"lessons learned" from the F/A-18 for cost, weight and safety
considerations. Approximate performance specifications will
include:
- Cruise Speed— 250 knots
- Maximum Speed— 300 knots
Range— 500 nautical miles




There are still gaps in the knowledge of the aerodynamic
aspects of the tilt rotor (such as complete flowfield effects
of the rotors and the downloading effect it has on the
wings), but no major problems have been discovered or
foreseen. Testing of all aspects of the aircraft continues
daily at NASA Ames to reduce the inherent risk involved with







PILOT FLIGHT HISTORY ENTERING RAND STUDY (in hours)
ARMY
TILT ROTOR
NAME HELICOPTER FIXED WING SIMULATOR ACT + SIM)
PILOT #1 5000 3300
PILOT #2 800 100
PILOT #3 3100 15
PILOT #4 2700 600
INDUSTRY
PILOT #5 5000 2000 200 350
(Bell Helicopter-Tilt Rotor Only)
PILOT #6 8000 1500 510 500
(Bell Helicopter-Tilt Rotor Only)
PILOT #7 3546 750 250
(Sikorsky Aircraft-Helicopter Only)
PILOT #8 1700 1300 280 60
(Boeing Vertol-Helicopter Only)
NASA AMES
PILOT #9 1500 3500 386 11





E-l Bob up, fire, bob down
E-2 Engage 12 degree depressed target, evade thru pass
E-3 Engage 8 degree depressed target, evade thru pass
E-4 Bob up, fire, forward dash to clearing
E-5 Bob up, fire, lateral dash to clearing
E-6 Lateral unmask, fire, lateral mask
E-7 Fire in transit, dash to clearing
Maneuver Mission Tasks
M-l Lateral acceleration and pedal turn
M-2 Near zero-G pedal turn
M-3 Depressed rocket firing
M-4 Elevated rocket firing
M-5 Forward dash
M-6 Forward quick stop
M-7 Cruise and quick mask
- M-8 Lateral hugh speed jinking
- M-9 Slalom and missile fire









Fixed Wing Flight Time
Total Simulator Time— Helo
— Fixed Wing
Tilt Rotor Time Actual
Simulator
1. a) What was your overall impression of the simulator





b) Did one simulator have a more realistic feel than the
other? If so, which one and why? Do you feel that the
simulator f ield-of -view limited or affected your flying
abilities in any maneuvers? If so, which ones?
2. With respect to your background in helicopters:
a) What were the most difficult transitions in switching
to the tilt rotor? Which components were most difficult to
"master" , or the most confusing to understand? Use the
following list as an aid:
TRANSITION DIFFERENCES RANK ORDER OF DIFFICULTY
Different thrust response
Nacelles
Lateral Translation Mode (LTM)
Greater Pilot-Induced Oscillations
Please add others you feel are pertinent, please.
b) Which capabilities did you utilize the best? the
least/worst?
c) With the understanding that tilt rotor experience was
generally limited before the RAND study, do you feel you
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successfully flew the tilt rotor to a reasonably maximal
effectiveness, or did you find yourself tending to fly it
like a helicopter? Please explain.
3. Which type of maneuvers were most difficult? (Rank if
possible, using 1 as the hardest, 2 as next hardest, etc.)
Acceleration Stabilizing at an airspeed
Deceleration Using aft nacelles to decel
Pedal turns Maintaining pitch attitude
Yaw control Altitude control
Turns Scheduling of wing flaps
List any others you felt were significant, whether easy or
hard.
4. Do you feel you flew more aggressively in the simulator
than you do in real flight? (circle one) Yes/No
This next section deals loosely with Human Factors , which can
be described as "keeping the operator (pilot) of the aircraft
and his physical capabilities and limitations in mind when
designing the cockpit." In the context of the RAND study, I
realize that the cockpits were only skeletal in nature and
not designed with human factors in mind. Thus, please answer
only with the major systems in mind. You can base your
answers either on the real aircraft or the simulators, but
please specify which you are describing.
5. How would you compare the tilt rotor cockpit set-up with
that of a helicopter? What seems "out of place"? What
systems/ switches seem to have had human factors considera-
tions performed in the design phase? Which do not? What
would you change and where would you put it? (Or is the set-
up fine as is?) Do you feel this "discrepancy" (for those, if
any, noted) affected your overall performance in the RAND
study?
6. With respect to the new systems that the tilt rotor
provides, is the cockpit "too busy"? Does the added
complexity of these systems "wash out" the positive effects
that they are supposed to provide? What automated systems do
you feel the LHX needs most to reduce pilot workload?
7. Was target acquisition different in the two simulators?
If so, which was easiest?
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8. Do you advocate a single- or dual-piloted tilt rotor
aircraft? How about in the LHX, assuming it turns out not to






— Monitor, Scan, Survey
2
— Detect Movement, Change in Size, Brightness
3
— Trace, Follow, Track
4
— Align, Aim, Orient On
5
— Discriminate Symbols, Numbers, Words
6
— Discriminate Based on Multiple Aspects
AUDITORY
1
— Detect Occurrence of Sound, Tone, etc.
2
— Detect Change in Amplitude, Pulse Rate, Pitch
3
— Comprehend Semantic Content of Message
4












— Formulation of Plans (Projecting Action Sequence, etc.)
6-- Evaluation (Consider Several Aspects in Reaching
Judgement)
7
— Estimation, Calculation, Conversion
PSYCHOMOTOR
1
— Discrete Actuation (Button, Toggle, Trigger)
2
— Discrete Adjustive (Variable Dial, etc.)
3
— Speech Using Prescribed Format




— Manipulative (Handling Objects, Maps, etc.)
6
— Symbolic Production (Writing)
7
— Serial Discrete Manipulation (Keyboard Entries)
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